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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14374

-vsWALLACE MURPHY PLUM,'
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of
Wallace Murphy Plum for the crime of receiving ataL&a
property in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 76-6-408
(1953) as amended by Laws of Utah 1973.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal respondent seeks to have the
verdict of guilty affirmed,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 3, 19 75, Sanders Coin Shop at
432 Twenty-fifth Street in Ogden, Utah, was robbed of
an assortment of gold and silver coins (R. 6) •
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Four days later, on July 7, 19 75, defendant
entered the Rust Coin and Gift Shop at 311 South Main
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, with a satchel of coins
which defendant indicated he wished to sell (R.65).
After making an inventory of the coins, Mr* Rust offered
defendant $2,850.00 for the coins (R. 66-67).

The

defendant said he would check the offer and return,
which he did about two hours later.

Mr. Rust indicated

he would need time to raise the money agreed upon as
the sale price, whereupon defendant said he would return
the next day (T. 6 8).

The coins were left with Mr.

Rust overnight.
While defendant was still in Rust's coin
store, an employee of Mr. Rust pointed out to the
owner a list of coins taken in the Ogden robbery.
The Rust shop had received a telephone call after
the robbery informing them of the robbery and describing
the coins missing (R.68).

After defendant had left Mr.

Rust checked the coins defendant had brought to him.
Mr. Rust then notified the police (R. 69).
On July 8, 1975, defendant returned to the
Rust Coin Shop and was given a check for $2,850.00 by
Mr. Rust.

Defendant was then arrested by Officer Peck
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for receiving stolen property.

Mr* Sanders identified

some of the coins defendant sold to Mr. Rust as part
of the coins that had been taken from his shop on
July 3, 1975 (R. 34).
Under questioning by Officer Peck, Mr. Plum
could neither name nor adequately describe the person
from whom he acquired the coins (R. 92-9 3).

Mr. Plum

could not provide an address for the person who transmitted the coins to him.

At one point in the question-

ing the defendant informed Officer Peck that he had
traded diamonds and jewelry for the coins (R. 93), but
later defendant stated that he had paid $2,600.00 cash
on the spot for the coins (R. 94)• Defendant sometimes
referred to the person from whom he acquired the coins
as

f,

hen and other times used the pronoun "they" in

describing the source of the coins (R. 95).
After all evidence was presented, the case
was referred to the jury, and a signed verdict was
returned finding defendant guilty of receiving stolen
property, believing the property probably to have
been stolen.

(

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1953) AS AMENDED
BY THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1973, IS SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN
TO INFORM PERSONS WHO WOULD BE LAW ABIDING OF THE
CRITERION THEY MUST MEET IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE
LAW, THUS NOT RENDERING THE STATUTE VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, as enacted by the
1973 Utah legislature, makes criminally liable any
person; who receives, retains or disposes of the
property of another "Knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it probably has been stolen."

The

quoted language is also employed within the Model
Penal Code, § 223.6.

Appellant argues that the

quoted part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 8 states
two crimes having different elements and requiring
differing quantums of proof.

Appellant further

argues that the statute fails to inform persons
who would be 3aw abiding of criterion that must be
met in order to avoid violating statutory prohibitions.
In response to the assertion that Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-40 8 contains two crimes with differing quantums
of proof, respondent would argue that either the receipt
of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, or
receipt of stolen property believing it probably has
been stolen, must be established beyond a reasonable
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doubt.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 as amended

by Laws of Utah, 1973, requires that the same quantum
of proof be applicable to each and every element of
any crime charged.
That statute provides in pertinent part:
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding
is presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The words 'element of the offense1 are
defined to mean '(a) the conduct,
attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibted, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) the culpable mental state required.•"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (Supp. 1975).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 sets forth as an
element of receiving stolen property either that
defendant knew the property was stolen or believed it
probably was stolen.

Clearly, as required by Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-501, quoted above, whichever alternative the jury finds supportable by the evidence must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Turning to appellant's argument that the
statute fails to inform law abiding citizens of the
standard that must be met, it is indeed true that
guilty knowledge on the part of one receiving property
is an essential element of most receiving, stolen property
statutes,

21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 88.

However, it is within the power of the state
legislature to substitute for guilty knowlege a duty
to diligently inquire as to the source of goods.
People v. Rosenthal, 226 U.S. 260, 57 L.Ed. 212, 33
S.Ct.27 (1912).

In Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 the Utah

legislature has not only made a crime the receipt of
stolen property with knowledge it was stolen but also
has required more from the citizens of Utah.

The

legislature has placed criminal sanctions upon an
individual if the state can produce evidence establishing that he received stolen property "believing it
probably had been stolen."

In effect, this statute

places a duty of diligent inquiry upon anyone who
would receive, retain or dispose of the property of
another.
Appellant has cited Connally v. General
Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 (1925) , in support of the proposition that Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-408
is void for vagueness.

In Connally, the Court stated

that prior Supreme Court decisions which had upheld
statutes as sufficiently certain were often based
upon the finding that the questioned statutes employed
words well enough known to enable persons within their
reach to correctly apply the statute.
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Or, in some

cases, it was found that words used within challenged
statutes actually had a well-settled common law meaning,
"Notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition
as to which estimates might differ."

269 U.S. at p. 391.

In reviewing statutes that had been found by
the Supreme Court to be unconstitutionally vague,
Connally repeatedly cited words such as "unjust" or
"unreasonable."

The statute at issue in Connally

required payment of wages by certain employers to be
no lower than other wages paid in the locality.

The

Supreme Court found the word "locality" to be imprecise,
too dependent upon circumstances, and equally satisfied by several different measures*
The word "probably" is not so imprecise
or dependent upon circumstances as to render it
void for vagueness.

"Probably" has been defined to

mean "reasonably, credibly, presumably, in all probability, very likely, so far as evidence shows, likely."
Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 138 N.W.2d 808, 179 Neb. 496
(1965).

Although there may be an estimate of degree

on the definition of "probably" as to which persons
might differ, such a difference in degree cannot be
said to render a statute employing the word "probably"
void for vagueness.

(

Turning to the use of the word "belief" it has been
held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Heygoth v., State,
275 Wis, 104, 81 N.W.2d 56 (1957), that a belief that
goods received were stolen is equivalent to knowledge.
Weaver v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 309, 235 P.635 (1925),
cited by appellant, also held that a belief that
property was stolen, when evidence shows that it was
in fact stolen, is equivalent to knowledge.

.

Further, it has been consistently held that
actual knowledge by a defendant that goods are stolen
need not be established.

It is sufficient if the

defendant had knowledge of facts sufficient to put him
on notice that the goods were stolen.

State v.

Rockett, 6 Wash. App. 399, 493 P.2d 321 (1972).
Certain state statutes have substituted for actual
belief, the existence of reasonable grounds for belief
that goods were stolen.

Farzley v. State, 163 So.39 4,

231 Ala. 60 (1935); Mott v. State, 24 Ala. App. 580,
139 So. 118 (1932).

The Utah Legislature has in

effect made such a substitute in the statute at issue
herein by the use of the phrase "believing the property
had probably been stolen."
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The United States Supreme Court recently
agreed that it is not necessary to show actual knowledge
that goods received were stolen.

In Barnes v. United

States, 93 S.Ct 2357, 412 U.S. 837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380
(19 73), the defendant had been convicted of receiving
stolen United States Treasury checks.

In writing

for the majority Justice Powell found:
"The evidence established that
petitioner possessed recently stolen
Treasury checks payable to persons
he did not know, and it provided no
plausible explanation for such
possession consistent with innocence.
On the basis of this evidence alone common sense and experience tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of
the high probability that the checks were
stolen." 93 S.Ct. at p. 2363.
Again, respondent argues that the Utah legislature
has codified Barnes and other decisions in imposing
criminal sanctions upon one who has received stolen
property "beLieving it probably had been stolen."
POINT II
INSTRUCTION NO 10 DEFINING "BELIEVING" AND
"PROBABLY" AS THOSE TERMS ARE USED IN THE DEFINITION
OF THE CRIME CHARGED, AND INSTRUCTION NO. 7, DEFINING
"REASONABLE DOUBT" ARE NOT INCONSISTENT.

Appellant argues that the Court1s definition
of reasonable doubt given in Instruction No. 7 (R. 209)
and the definitions of "believing" and "probably" given
in Instruction No. 10 (R. 212) cannot be reconciled with
the verdict returned by the jury.
More specifically, appellant argues that it is
not possible to fail to find defendant "knew" property
was stolen and yet find beyond a reasonable doubt a
"belief that it had probably been stolen,"
However, it must be pointed out that three
verdicts were submitted to the jury, a "Not Guilty"
verdict (R. 229), a "guilty of theft by receiving
knowing said property had been stolen" verdict (R. 230),
and, finally, a "guilty of theft by receiving believing
said property probably had been stolen" verdict (R. 233).
The third verdict was returned signed (R. 233) .
Instruction No 8 sets forth the elements of
the crime charged, and states that the jury must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence
of each element.

Included among the elements in

Instruction No. 8(4) is the fact that at the time
the property was received defendant either (a) knew
it was stolen; or (b) believed that it probably was
stolen.
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Thus, Instruction No. 8 properly reflects
the intent of the legislature that a conviction can
rest upon an evidentiary showing of actual knowledge,
or a belief that the property probably had been stolen,
By signing the third verdict (R.- 233) the jury indicated
that it unanimously found "beyond a reasonable doubt11,
each element set forth therein*

From all the evidence

presented the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant believed that the coins probably had
been stolen.

The jury was properly instructed in

No. 8 that either actual knowledge, or belief that
the property had probably been stolen, must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict defendant.
The jury was not required to find both alternatives,
and thus the verdict returned is consistent with
Instructions No. 7 and 10.
As argued by the Respondent in the discussion
under Point I, the words "believing11 and "probably"
have well-defined meanings, and these were set forth
in Instruction No. 10. The jury instructions properly
set forth the elements of the crime in Instruction No.
8, defined two words that constitute one of the elements
in Instruction No. 10, and finally defined "reasonable
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i

doubt" in Instruction No. 7.

Taken together the jury

instructions properly advise the jury of each step that
must be followed to arrive at one of the three V€>rdicts.
The verdict returned by the jury is consistent with
the instructions read as a comprehensive group.
POINT III
THE RECORD REFLECTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

{

TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY AGAINST
DEFENDANT,
As has so often been stated, "the test on

I

appeal becomes whether substantial evidence supports
the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the
evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

<

People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal.3d 245, 107 Cal. Rptr, 184,
507 P.2d 1392, at p. 1395 (1973).

The jury in the case
\

at issue herein had theopportunity to hear all witnesses
and weigh the credibility of the testimony.

If there

is competent evidence from which reasonable minds
might draw differing conclusions, the finding of
the jury will not be disturbed upon appeal.

.

\

State v.

Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
The evidence establishes that a theft of

<

coins from Sanders Coin Shop in Ogden occurred on
July 3, 19 75.

Just four days later, on July 7, 19 75, an

individual identified as Wallace Murphy Plum, the
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'

defendant, entered Rust's Coin and Gift Shop in Salt
Lake City carrying a satchel of coins.

Mr. Plum

expressed an intent to solicit an offer on the coins.
After examining the coins Mr. Rust offered the defendant
$2,850.00 for the entire collection.

The offer was

accepted after defendant conferred with an unidentified
person.

When defendant came to pick up the check the

next day he was arrested.

The coins were identified

as those taken during the Ogden robbery.
After his arrest by Officer Peck on July 8,
19 75, Mr. Plum was asked where he had acquired the
coins.

Mr. Plum responded that a man had come into

his office with them; however, Mr. Plum could
neither give the manfs name nor a description (R. 929 3) . At one point in the questioning by Officer Peck
Mr. Plum stated that he had traded diamonds and
jewelry for the coins (R. 9 3) but later Mr. Plum
stated that he had given the unknown man $2600.00
cash on the spot for the coins (R. 94) •
When asked how he happened to have that much
cash, Mr. Plum told Officer Peck that he "does a lot
of turquoise," according to Officer Peckfs testimony.
Under questioning Mr. Plum usually referred to the
seller as "he" but occasionally used the pronoun
"them."

(R. 94). However, at no time could Mr. Plum

identify from whom he received the coins, a description

-

"I **

— "

of the person or an address (R. 9 5) . No paperwork and
no receipt accompanied the transaction between Mr. Plum and
the person or persons from whom the coins were acquired
(R. 92).
It has consistently been held that evidence of
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods by an
individual charged with unlawfully receiving them is
admissible, and is a strong circumstance a jury can
consider with all other evidence on the question of
guilty knowledge.

State v. Tollett, 71 Wash.2d 806,

431 P.2d 168 (1967).

All circumstances surrounding

acquisition of recently stolen property and a defendant's
contradictory statements have been held to give rise
to the justifiable inference that the defendant knew
property was stolen.
715 (1970).

United States v. May, 430 F.2d

In Barnes, supra, the United States

Supreme Court found that possession of recently stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance from which the jury may properly draw an
inference and find that the person in possession
knew the property had been stolen.
All the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition of the coins by Mr. Plum, including his
inability to name, describe or give an address for the
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for the seller, his contradictory statements regarding
payment for the coins, the lack of any paperwork or a
receipt, the cash transaction, and the possession by Mr.
Plum of property stolen four days prior, are sufficient to support the verdict.
It was within the province of the jury to
weigh the testimony of Mr. Pantelakis (R. 150 et. seq.)
and Mr. Van Komen (R. 138 et. seq.) in determining
defendant's state of mind upon receiving the stolen
coins.

Roberts, supra.

Respondent would argue that

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received
the coins stolen from the Sanders Coin Shop in Ogden
believing that the coins probably had been stolen, as
prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953) as
amended by the Laws of Utah 1973.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, it is respectfully urged that
the jury verdict of guilty be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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